Barra e provës filozofike

Barra e provës filozofike ose onus (probandi) është detyrimi që në një mosmarrëveshje epistemike të jepet mbështetje e mjaftueshme për pozicionin e mbajtur.

Mbajtësi i barrës

Kur debatohet ndonjë çështje, është një barrë e nënkuptuar e provës te personi që e bën pohimin. "Nëse kjo përgjegjësi apo barrë e provës zhvendoset te kritiku, kryhet falsiteti i thirrjes në injorancë".^[1] Kjo barrë nuk kërkon domosdoshmërish një provë matematikore apo logjike rigoroze, edhe pse shumë argumente të forta arrijnë në këtë nivel (të tilla si siloxhizmat logjike). Përkundrazi, standardi i provave të kërkuara për një pohim të caktuar përcaktohet sipas konventës ose standardeve të komunitetit, në relacion me kontekstin e pohimit në fjalë.^[2]^[3]

Në diskursin publik

Barra e provës është gjithashtu një koncept i rëndësishëm në arenën publike të ideve. Duke supozuar se të dyja palët kanë rënë dakord për një diskurs të arsyetuar,^[4] barra e provës mund të shërbejë si një mjet efektiv për të siguruar që të gjitha argumentet përkatëse nga të dyja anët e një çështjeje janë përfshirë. Pasi të krijohen supozimet e përbashkëta, mekanizmi i barrës së provës merr përsipër për t'i mbajtur ato të angazhuara në diskursin e fokusuar në ofrimin e dëshmisë dhe argumenteve bindëse për pozicionet e tyre.^[5]^[6]^[7]

Referimet

↑ Michalos, Alex. 1969. Principles of Logic. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. p 370 - “usually one who makes an assertion must assume the responsibility of defending it. If this responsibility or burden of proof is shifted to a critic, the fallacy of appealing to ignorance is committed.”
↑ Leite, Adam. 2005. “A Localist Solution to the Regress of Justification.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: p. 418 - "[t]he point of articulating reasons in defense of one’s belief is to establish that one is justified in believing as one does."
↑ Leite, Adam. 2005. “A Localist Solution to the Regress of Justification.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: p. 403 - "justificatory conversation...[is]...characterized by a person’s sincere attempt to vindicate his or her entitlement to a belief by providing adequate reasons in its defense and responding to objections"
↑ Goldman, Alvin. 1994. “Argumentation and Social Epistemology.” Journal of Philosophy, 91: 27-49.
↑ Eemeren, Frans van, and Grootendorst, Rob. 2004. A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 60 - "[t]here is no point in venturing to resolve a difference of opinion through an argumentative exchange of views if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point"
↑ Brandom, Robert. 1994. Making it Explicit. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 222 - "[t]here are sentence types that would require a great deal of work for one to get into a position to challenge, such as 'Red is a color,' 'There have been black dogs,' 'Lighting frequently precedes thunder,' and similar commonplaces. These are treated as 'free moves' by members of our speech community --- they are available to just about anyone any time to use as premises, to assert unchallenged.",
↑ Adler, Jonathan. 2002. Belief’s Own Ethics. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 164-167

[1] Michalos, Alex. 1969. Principles of Logic. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. p 370 - “usually one who makes an assertion must assume the responsibility of defending it. If this responsibility or burden of proof is shifted to a critic, the fallacy of appealing to ignorance is committed.”

[2] Leite, Adam. 2005. “A Localist Solution to the Regress of Justification.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: p. 418 - "[t]he point of articulating reasons in defense of one’s belief is to establish that one is justified in believing as one does."

[3] Leite, Adam. 2005. “A Localist Solution to the Regress of Justification.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: p. 403 - "justificatory conversation...[is]...characterized by a person’s sincere attempt to vindicate his or her entitlement to a belief by providing adequate reasons in its defense and responding to objections"

[4] Goldman, Alvin. 1994. “Argumentation and Social Epistemology.” Journal of Philosophy, 91: 27-49.

[5] Eemeren, Frans van, and Grootendorst, Rob. 2004. A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 60 - "[t]here is no point in venturing to resolve a difference of opinion through an argumentative exchange of views if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point"

[6] Brandom, Robert. 1994. Making it Explicit. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. p. 222 - "[t]here are sentence types that would require a great deal of work for one to get into a position to challenge, such as 'Red is a color,' 'There have been black dogs,' 'Lighting frequently precedes thunder,' and similar commonplaces. These are treated as 'free moves' by members of our speech community --- they are available to just about anyone any time to use as premises, to assert unchallenged.",

[7] Adler, Jonathan. 2002. Belief’s Own Ethics. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 164-167

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